Live safely in public places, do not be a follower take the lead – lessons from the Switzerland fire.

The underlying message of this important post is to never assume you are safe in crowded places, Always, know, in advance, at least one alternative emergency exit door and / or pathway to safety and take/lead others.

The horrific fire in Switzerland at the “Le Constellation” nightclub where 41 young people lost their lives, some while filming the fire and the equally tragic shootings in Bondi are just two examples.

With ever increasing regulations and risk management by many organisations, I think if fair to say that it is easy for individuals to become complacent when it comes to the potential for these types of incidents in public places such as night clubs, concerts and other large inside and outside gathering places. We seem think it will never happen and yet we see increasingly random and not so random events e.g. mass shootings even on our shores.

Over the next day or two I will discuss a couple of events from my own experience and the lessons learned from each. If you feel any of these cases would be of interest to your clients, as always feel free to share.

I start today by having a look at what went so wrong for those in the Le Constellation nightclub. I want to thank Terry Jackson, a very experienced fire officer based in Perth for sharing his work with us.

The first point is the owner of the nightclub purchased some egg box foam as sound proofing from a do it yourself store and fitted it to the ceiling of the club himself. This material is made from polyurethane which is highly flammable with no fire retardant added. For those who are not aware the product is manufactured from petroleum products.

The height of the ceiling was approximately 3 meters.

When polyurethane burns, molten droplets fall causing rapid fire spread, burning anything / anyone below. This material is a very real safety, environment and property threat.

The Le Constellation basement bar, café, and Terrace – 2 stories. The basement had an approved/ authorised capacity 200. The ground floor café and terrace capacity 140. In this type of incidents, it is common for the affected area to be overcrowded.

Despite these numbers the basement had no sprinkler system which had one been present and working, the result would have been totally different.

Fire Cause

The fire was started by patrons waving around lit Fountain Candle sparklers. These had sparks that were at least 30 cm long. One photograph showed a young lady on the shoulders of a man with the lady waving around the lit sparklers.

Casualty list

• 41 dead (34 bodies at base of staircase, behind service door and perhaps emergency exit door). Average age of those who died was 19. Youngest was 14 and the oldest 39.
• 115 injured. It appears that only 44 of a probable 200 people escaped up the stairs without serious injury.

Quote from injured patron
“It was as though the ceiling had been soaked with something and instantly caught fire.”

Uncontrolled Evacuation

As naturally happened people panicked, most trying to escape via the staircase (the way they came in).

Evacuees moved upstairs through toxic smoke and heat. A bottleneck at the top of the stairs caused delays, whilst conditions deteriorated. Opening the door at the top of the stairs allowed smoke and heat to enter the ground floor, resulting in people trying to escape through considerable smoke and heat.

• Doors on the exit pathway were reported to open inwards – against travel direction. This is something that was identified as a huge issue well over 100 years ago.

• One source reported an emergency exit was near the basement bathroom. There are no reports of anyone escaping from the basement other than by the stairs.

• No fire alarm was fitted. Early warning may have saved more lives.

• Video showed many people did not start to evacuate until at least 30 seconds after the fire started – people were filming the fire – a fatal error. 34 of 41 bodies were found in basement locations. In a 2003 fire at the Station Nightclub, Rhode Island USA people also delayed evacuation (100 people died and 200 were injured).

• Reports suggest staff did not know the emergency evacuation procedure.

• It seems no fire extinguishers were used. From my research there appears to have only been one across the basement and ground floors.

Fire behaviour – Smoke kills
• Smoke spreads faster than fire. Visibility drops quickly; wayfinding becomes difficult.

• Heat and toxic smoke/gases rise to ceiling, spreads out and down. Smoke and heat will flow through openings such as staircases, doors and windows. When evacuating upstairs, evacuees will be passing through toxic smoke and heat. Temperatures at ceiling height can quickly rise to between 600 and 900 degrees Celsius within just a few minutes.

• It appears that the interior of the basement in this case, no doubt fueled by the sound proofing material, was fully engulfed within 90 seconds.

Lessons for facility owners/operators – common failures in public buildings/events

• Often buildings are found to be non-compliant e.g. insufficient and/or locked or blocked exits, no emergency plan, use of non-fire-retardant materials, no exit signage.
• Often staff are untrained in emergency response / evacuation, fire equipment use etc.

Can you put yourself in the shoes of the owner of this night club since this tragic event.

Swiss law

Under Swiss Law, public venues with a capacity of 200 people or more are required to have:

• Several emergency exits – two exits in this scenario is clearly inadequate.

• Smoke exhaust systems installed – remove smoke and heat improving visibility and reducing chance of becoming overcome. Not installed – a question for authorities.

• Furnishings that are certified as non-flammable – clearly not the case here,

• Authorisation for the use of any interior pyrotechnics

Criminal Enquiry

The case is subject to an ongoing criminal investigation. I will share the outcome once it is known.

Insurance

It will be interesting to learn if there had been a risk survey either independently and or by their insurer prior to the loss.

What has been reported is that last inspection was in 2019, 5 years ago. I would assume this was by the local fire authority.

Equally interesting will be to learn if the property and liability insurers have accepted liability.

Fire / Emergency Personal Safety Message

I end by returning to the most important message that Terry and I would like to convey. That is always know at least one alternative emergency exit door and or pathway to safety wherever you are.